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Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor
Paulsen
Steven G. Calabresit
Let me begin by saying that I come to praise Professor
Paulsen not to bury him.1 Indeed, I am in substantial agree-
ment with much of what Professor Paulsen has just said about
both United States v. Nixon2 and about the nature of American-
style judicial review. I agree with Professor Paulsen that the
text, structure, and history of our Constitution do not give the
power to interpret or enforce that document to any one branch
of our national government, including the federal courts. I
thus disagree with the judicial supremacist doctrine of Cooper
v. Aaron3 and agree with Jefferson, Madison, Jackson, Lincoln,
Franklin Roosevelt, and Meese that the President is co-equal
as a constitutional interpreter to the Supreme Court.4 Indeed,
I so advised former Attorney General Meese when I accompa-
nied him to New Orleans twelve years ago to deliver his Tulane
speech, a document that I helped to develop and edit.5
t George C. Dix Professor of Constitutional Law, 1998-2000, North-
western University. I would like to thank Gary Lawson, Akhil Amar, Thomas
Merrill, John Harrison, and my fellow participants in the University of Min-
nesota Law School Symposium on the 25th anniversary of United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), for their many helpful suggestions and comments.
1. I have known Professor Paulsen since law school and consider him to
be one of the best law professors in the country. Notwithstanding my dis-
agreement with him on this one issue, he is a beacon of sanity and moral prin-
ciple in these otherwise troubled times.
2. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
3. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
{ See generally THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, WHO SPEAKS FOR THE
CONSTITUTION? THE DEBATE OVER INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY (1992) [herein-
after WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CONSTITUTION?] (collecting statements by all of
the individuals listed above and many others who support a role for presi-
dents in constitutional interpretation).
5. See Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 NW. U. L. REV.
269, 274 & nn.28-29 (1993) (endorsing departmentalism and mentioning my
role in assisting with the Tulane Speech).
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The essence of the Departmentalist position, as Professor
Paulsen has reminded us, is that the text of the U.S. Constitu-
tion does not contain a judicial review clause. There is simply
no provision in the document that gives either the Courts or
any other branch of the federal government the power to en-
force or interpret the Constitution.6 Our Constitution differs in
this respect from the constitutions of most other modern de-
mocracies which expressly empower their constitutional courts,
and only their constitutional courts, to engage in constitutional
"interpretation."7 This difference is striking because the Con-
stitution takes great care to spell out and enumerate the pow-
ers it grants to each institution of our national government.8
Accordingly, the absence of an enumerated power of judicial
review means that the doctrine of Cooper v. Aaron9 is plainly at
war with the text of the Constitution. Either there is no judi-
cial review or there is departmental, coordinate three branch
enforcement of the Constitution. The text allows for no other
conclusion.
Departmentalists and Professor Paulsen agree that the
text of the Constitution gives the federal courts the power to
decide cases or controversies and that in exercising this power
the Courts can, indeed they must, make independent assess-
ments of the constitutionality of any government action that is
properly before them. Professor Paulsen, however, disagrees
with most other departmentalists in his understanding of what
the judicial power to decide a case or controversy entails. Al-
most alone among departmentalists, he thinks this power only
entitles the courts to hear a case and write an opinion but that
it does not legally obligate the executive branch to execute the
judgment that results.10
6. See Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Dif-
ficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (1998) (developing some implica-
tions of the absence of a judicial review clause for theories of the judicial role).
7. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 93, §§ 1-2 (F.R.G.);
CONST. art. 61, 1 (R.F.); id. art. 62, 1; Konst. R.F. (1994) ch. 7, art. 120, § 2
(R.F.); id. ch. 7, art. 125, §§ 4-6; see also Steven G. Calabresi, The Political
Question of Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 157 n.13 (1995)
(comparing the absence of a judicial review clause in the United States Con-
stitution with the texts of some foreign constitutions).
8. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing the powers of Congress); id.
art. H, §§ 1-2 (listing the powers of the President); id. art. III, §§ 1-2 (listing
the powers and jurisdiction of the federal courts).
9. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
10. Professor Paulsen's views are set out and defended in Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law
[Vol. 83:14211422
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I strongly disagree with Professor Paulsen's narrow con-
struction of the judicial power to resolve cases or controversies.
And, I consider this issue to be absolutely central to any dis-
cussion of United States v. Nixon" because in my view the Su-
preme Court was wrong to find that dispute between President
Nixon and his subordinate, Leon Jaworski, to be a justiciable
case or controversy. The dispute between Nixon and Jaworski
was an internal executive branch disagreement which provided
no occasion for the exercise of the power of judicial review.12
Accordingly, the Nixon Court's judgment was in error, the
opinion should not have issued, the justices should not have
opined on executive privilege, and the tapes should have
stayed secret pending impeachment proceedings at which point
they would have to have been disclosed. In short, the Supreme
Court's performance in United States v. Nixon was abysmal,
even if understandable given the circumstances.
The key aspect of United States v. Nixon that the Supreme
Court overlooked was this: Richard Nixon as President of the
United States possessed the Executive Power, which in our
constitutional tradition includes the power to initiate and con-
trol all federal prosecutions. 3 Leon Jaworski, the Special
Prosecutor, was Richard Nixon's subordinate. Jaworski was
not merely removable by Nixon but was also subject to his con-
trol and direction in all his exercises of the executive power.
When Nixon corruptly and crookedly invoked the constitution-
ally proper doctrine of executive privilege as part of his crimi-
nal effort to obstruct justice, Jaworski as his subordinate had
no choice but to follow his boss's order. The constitutional
remedy for this misconduct was for the House of Representa-
tives to impeach Nixon' 4 or at a minimum for the House itself
to subpoena Nixon's tapes. That subpoena could validly have
Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994), and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman
Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15
CARDOzO L. REV. 81 (1993).
11. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
12. Indeed, Nixon's lawyers argued as much in their brief before the Su-
preme Court only to see their position wrongly rejected.
13. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi &
Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century, 47
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1531-38 (1997).
14. My knowledge of the relevant history leaves me with no doubt what-
soever that obstruction of justice is a high crime and misdemeanor which can
support the impeachment and removal of any executive or judicial official in
our federal government, particularly the President.
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been enforced in federal court as could have been a subpoena
on behalf of one of the named defendants in the underlying
Jaworski prosecution.
The bottom line is that just as the President cannot be
prosecuted until he has first been impeached and removed, 15 so
too he cannot be sued in Court by a subordinate who is consti-
tutionally subject in all ways to his official powers of supervi-
sion and control. The "lawsuit" between Jaworski and Nixon
was thus feigned or artificial in every way.16 Moreover, it was
a "lawsuit" that Nixon could at any point have ended with a
pardon, just as President Clinton could at any time end the
Starr investigation (of which he is so fond of complaining) with
a pardon. The Supreme Court had no more business arbitrat-
ing this dispute than it would have arbitrating a disagreement
between the State Department and the Department of Defense
or a dispute between the House Ways and Means Committee
and the Committee on Appropriations.
My first response, then, to Professor Paulsen's paper is to
observe that, since I do not believe United States v. Nixon was
a properly brought case or controversy, I do not think any
opinion should have issued, nor do I think there was any occa-
sion here for the Supreme Court to exercise the power of judi-
cial review-at all. Different litigants-the House of Represen-
tatives or one of the named defendants, perhaps-could
properly have sought a subpoena of the Nixon Tapes, but not
Leon Jaworski.
Well what of Professor Paulsen's broader claim about
presidential invocations of executive privilege. Specifically,
what should we make of the claim that the President cannot be
bound by judicial judgments as to the scope of executive privi-
lege-that he must be able ultimately to judge for himself
whether it is appropriate to invoke executive privilege and
make the invocation stick even in a case brought by a proper
litigant.
15. See Akbil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege
Against Prosecution, 2 NEXUS 11, 18-20 (1997) (discussing the unique nature
and position of the Presidency as justification against prosecution).
16. It is well-settled law that such suits are not justiciable. See United
States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943) (per curiam) (deciding that there was
no case or controversy because the suit was not adversary); Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (holding that the Supreme Court can only give a
judicial declaration as to the validity of an act of Congress if there is an actual
case or controversy).
[Vol. 83:14211424
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Here I am much more skeptical of Professor Paulsen's
claim, which, as I have already said, is part of a larger thesis
he has advanced to the effect that the President is not legally
bound by court judgments in properly litigated cases or contro-
versies with which he, the President, disagrees.
As to this larger thesis, I submit that arguments from text,
structure, original history, and subsequent practice all suggest
that Professor Paulsen is wrong. The President is legally obli-
gated to enforce judicial judgments in cases or controversies
that he independently thinks are unconstitutional, subject to a
rule of clear mistake.1 7 This question is very important and the
balance of my comments will therefore be devoted to explaining
why Professor Paulsen is wrong on this larger point and there-
fore wrong also with respect to presidential refusals to abide by
court judgments on the scope of executive privilege.
The original text of the Constitution does not specifically
mention the executing of judgments or allocate any power to
execute judgments. Nonetheless, the text grants the President
the executive power and that power clearly includes the power
to execute judgments.1 8
The original text also grants the federal courts the judicial
power, which extends to nine categories of cases or controver-
sies. We know from various historical sources that this power
was not merely a power to render advisory opinions but was
instead a power finally to resolve actual disputes between ad-
verse litigants in such a way that there was a substantial like-
lihood that a court decision would have some real world ef-
fect.19
17. My analysis builds on the prior published arguments of my colleagues
Gary Lawson and Thomas Merrill. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore,
The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267,
1314-27 (1996); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions As Binding Law and As
Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 71 (1993) (arguing that
"the judiciary would be reduced to an adjunct of the executive branch" if the
President did not have to follow their judgments).
18. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 17, at 1314-19.
19. This assertion can be documented as a matter of hornbook law. See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 47-53 (2d ed. 1994). Admit-
tedly, as Alexander Bickel and Neal Katyal have pointed out, there are ways
in which the federal courts could fairly be said to give advice to the political
branches in some sense of that term. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges As Ad-
vicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998) (concluding that judicial advicegiving
can become an alternative to aggressive judicial review). Nonetheless, it is
also true that in some sense court judgments in litigated and adverse cases
are supposed to be substantially likely to make a difference in the real world
1999] 1425
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The ban on advisory opinions in our constitutional tradi-
tion is deeply rooted.2 0 Its underpinnings are confirmed by the
records we have of the Philadelphia Convention,21 by the ex-
change of letters known as The Correspondence of the Jus-
tices,22 by the decisions of the justices riding circuit in Hay-
bum's Case, 23 and by two centuries of subsequent doctrine
interpreting the case or controversy language in Article 111.24
While there is much controversy over the modem scope of the
Article III justiciability doctrines, those who challenge the doc-
trine today do so not because they think Court judgments
should be advisory. Rather, the modern critics of the Court's
doctrine think that too few cases are being allowed into federal
court and that too few binding judgments are being judicially
issued.25 Unlike the texts of many State constitutions26 and
constitutions of foreign countries, 27 the text of the U.S. Consti-
tution does not authorize the federal courts to issue advisory
opinions. It is an axiomatic feature of our Constitution that
there must be a substantial likelihood that judicial opinions
will have some real world effect.28 No such likelihood could
exist if Professor Paulsen were right that the President has the
power independently to make his own de novo decision about
whether any judicial judgment was constitutional or not before
he executed it. That is why for more than two hundred years
almost no one suggested that the courts would exercise a
merely advisory power.2 9
course of events.
20. See RICHARD B. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 93-98 (4th ed. 1996).
21. See id. at 10-11.
22. See id. at 92-93.
23. See id. at 99-107.
24. See id. at 99-293.
25. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992); Gene R. Nichol,
Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635
(1985).
26. Advisory opinions are permitted in Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Dakota according to
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73 n.4 (2d ed. 1988).
27. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 20, at 98 (discussing advisory opinions
in other legal systems).
28. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 50-51.
29. Accord Lawson & Moore, supra note 17, at 1319; Merrill, supra note
17, at 46.
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Now it is true, as Professor Paulsen has previously argued,
that some of Alexander Hamilton's loose language in the Fed-
eralist Papers30 and President Abraham Lincoln's actual ac-
tions in Ex Parte Merryman31 at the time of the outbreak of the
Civil War support the Paulsen thesis. It is also true that if the
federal courts made decisions that were so clearly mistaken
that they could be deemed to be irrational the executive would
not be legally bound to execute those clearly mistaken judg-
ments given what Paulsen calls the postulate of coordinacy.
But it is equally true that ordinarily, i.e., barring irrationality,
the President is legally bound to execute federal court judg-
ments32 and for two hundred years all American Presidents not
engaged in suppressing a Civil War have viewed themselves as
being so bound. Even Presidents who ardently subscribed to
departmentalism have acknowledged the legally binding force
and obligation to execute a judicial judgment with which they
disagreed.33 Why is it that for two hundred years even presi-
dents who hated the federal judiciary have acknowledged that
judicial judgments are binding in a way that the learned dis-
cussion taking place in this Symposium issue of the Minnesota
Law Review is not?
One reason, I believe, is simply that this is what everyone
both originally and ever since has understood the judicial
power to comprehend. But probably there is even more at work
than merely originally mandated legal obligation. At some
very fundamental level, I believe our constitutional history has
actually been one of departmentalism, as I understand it,
which is to say independent three branch enforcement of the
Constitution but with judicial judgments at least being legally
binding on the executive for their enforcement absent a clear
mistake. And, I would go even further and say that our prac-
tice in this respect has been what it has been because depart-
mentalism as I understand it works well, it produces good con-
30. Professor Paulsen particularly emphasizes Hamilton's famous essay
in THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 393-94 (Alexander Hamilton) (Wills ed., 1982)
to the effect that the judiciary will have to rely "upon the aid of the executive
arm even for the efficacy of its judgments."
31. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
32. I rely here on the powerful analysis of Lawson & Moore, supra note
17, at 1313-27.
33. Thus, for example, Abraham Lincoln argued that the Dred Scott deci-
sion was binding as to the parties in that particular case even though he was
vehemently opposed to allowing it to be turned into a general political rule.
See WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CONSTITUTION?, supra note 4, at 71-73.
14271999]
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sequences in the real world of American politics, or at least it
produces better consequences than would be produced by one
branch or by no branch enforcement of the Constitution.
34
First, with respect to my claim that all three branches ac-
tually do and always have enforced the Constitution, I want to
express my disagreement with the widespread but mistaken
view that the judiciary is today or was historically the supreme
enforcer or interpreter of the Constitution.35 This view is sim-
ply false, although it is true that the federal courts have al-
ways played a role in constitutional interpretation. From the
Founding era to the Civil War, the main role played by the fed-
eral courts was to legitimate constitutional interpretations al-
ready arrived at by the political branches of the federal gov-
ernment. Between the Civil War and the New Deal the Court
sometimes second-guessed Congress on constitutional issues
but mostly it upheld congressional determinations of constitu-
tional issues. Since 1937, the Court has upheld the over-
whelming majority of federal statutes it has reviewed except
for a handful struck down on First Amendment grounds36 and
very recently a few struck down on structural constitutional
grounds.37
Two distinct trends in this three branch enforcement of the
Constitution emerge over the last two hundred years. First,
the Supreme Court has, as Mr. Dooley said long ago, followed
the election returns.38 Forty-two presidents and 105 Senates
have used their power over Supreme Court nominations and
confirmations to give us Supreme Court justices whose con-
34. See Merrill, supra note 17, at 70-75; Calabresi, supra note 5, at 274-77
("This American 'departmentalist' system of multibranch enforcement of the
Constitution is an under-appreciated work of genius-particularly compared
to the in many ways stronger forms of judicial review recently adopted in
many other countries.").
35. See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-24 (2d ed. 1996) (introducing and describing the long
history of three branch constitutional interpretation and enforcement).
36. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (invalidating provisions of
the Federal Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (West
Supp. 1996)); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (invalidating the
Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1994)).
37. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998) (invali-
dating a statutory grant of line item veto power to the President on separation
of powers grounds); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (rejecting the
application of federal law to a noncommercial situation where the activity be-
ing regulated did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
38. See FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (1901).
[Vol. 83:14211428
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structions of the document reflected their own. This phenome-
non has been explained and discussed by Professors Robert
Dahl and Gerald Rosenberg in far more expert fashion than I
could hope to match here, so I will just incorporate their views
by reference.39 The first point to remember, though, is that
practice suggests that the Supreme Court is not a counterma-
joritarian body over the long term and thus the problem with
recent activist Supreme Courts is not that they are forcing an
unwilling people to go down a road they don't want to travel.40
Second, practice suggests that federal judicial review will
mainly be exercised at the expense of the States. Most hold-
ings of unconstitutionality involve federal invalidations of state
laws or executive practices. The federal judiciary is most ac-
tivist when it is picking on politically weak state officials. This
was true in the Lochner4' era and it is true in the era of Roe v.
Wade.42 To the extent there is a countermajoritarian difficulty,
the difficulty is this. A five to four majority of the Supreme
Court that responds to national majority whims gets to bind
the States to national majoritarian policy views without going
through the intended procedural hurdles of bicameralism and
presentment.43
Our overall practice, then, has been one of three branch
enforcement of the Constitution with the judiciary often play-
ing the most visible role but in fact subtly taking its lead from
the election returns which it follows. Mainly this national elec-
toral process has resulted in federal judicial invalidation of
state laws and practices that Congress and the President
might not otherwise have been able to invalidate. In my judg-
ment, the biggest problem raised by our practice is that it is too
easy for five to four Supreme Court majorities to invalidate
State laws, given that the Constitution prescribes bicameral-
ism and presentment before national lawmaking should occur.
Now, then, what has our practice been with respect to the
issue Professor Paulsen is most concerned about-executive
39. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court As a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); Gerald N. Rosen-
berg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REv. POL.
369 (1992); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
40. See Calabresi, supra note 6, at 1378.
41. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. See Calabresi, supra note 6, at 1378.
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enforcement of court judgments. Have presidents by and large
followed those judgments or has the execution of judgments,
too, followed the election returns. Obviously, the answer is
that presidents have overwhelmingly, indeed, they have almost
always executed all federal court judgments, including many
with which they vehemently disagreed. Even FDR during the
height of the New Deal Court-packing crisis did not think to re-
fuse to execute Supreme Court judgments. Except for Lincoln
in the very unusual climate of the Spring of 1861, no president
has openly defied and refused to execute a judgment.44
Why is this so, especially given that we know, and most
presidents probably know, that over time the Supreme Court
will eventually follow the election returns. What is accom-
plished by forcing Presidents to execute judgments they vehe-
mently object to until the election returns have their inevitable
enlightening effect. It is traditional to say that forcing the
President to follow court judgments means that we and he are
bound by the Rule of Law, but in what sense is that really so if
the Court is ultimately going to follow the election returns
44. As Professor Paulsen acknowledges, the crisis President Lincoln faced
in the spring of 1861 was the worst we have ever faced. See Paulsen, supra
note 10, at 278-84. The country had split into two halves and many Union
troops were trapped behind Confederate lines. Washington, D.C., the capital,
was in danger of falling into enemy hands. To prevent this from happening,
President Lincoln had to be able to transport soldiers through Maryland, a
border state, so that they could defend the capital. Riots in Baltimore and in
the Maryland countryside were disrupting railroad transports of soldiers. If
Washington, D.C., Maryland, and a few border states had gone over to the
Confederacy, the Civil War might have been lost before the Union could even
begin to fight. Accordingly, it was absolutely imperative that President Lin-
coln be able to transport troops to the capital in the spring of 1861 even if do-
ing so required suspending the writ of habeas corpus unilaterally. Since Con-
gress was not in session, President Lincoln's only option was to suspend the
writ himself pending approval from Congress as soon as it convened. Presi-
dent Lincoln did suspend the writ. Pursuant to this order, John Merryman
was arrested and denied habeas relief, Chief Justice Taney's order that Mer-
ryman be released was ignored, and Lincoln promptly asked Congress to
authorize his actions retroactively claiming that he had inherent emergency
power to preserve the Union until Congress could be convened.
Against the backdrop of these facts, I believe Chief Justice Taney's order
was so clearly irrational that President Lincoln was justified in believing that
he could constitutionally ignore Taney's order because the continuation of the
Union and of the Constitution itself depended upon his ignoring Taney's or-
der. President Lincoln's actions were reviewable in Congress and had Con-
gress not concurred in his judgment as to the severity of the emergency and
the irrationality of Taney's order, Congress would have been within its rights
to consider impeachment as a sanction for disregarding a valid court order in
a validly presented case or controversy.
[Vol. 83:14211430
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anyway. What is gained by making FDR wait until 1941 for
United States v. Darby45 instead of letting him just have his
way from the start.46
Obviously, one value that is served is the promotion of
gradualism. Constitutional change gets spaced out over time
and is dependent on multiple senatorial and presidential elec-
tion cycles and on the pace of judicial retirements. Under the
Paulsen regime, in contrast, every new presidency would im-
mediately mean a new "Constitution" which new "Constitution"
would immediately end when said president left office. This it
seems to me would be not so much a system of constitutional
government as it would be a system of rule by an elected Na-
poleonic strongman.
Another value that is served by legally obligating presi-
dents to enforce Court judgments with which they disagree is
that such an obligation protects individuals from being oppres-
sively singled out and burdened. In this way, the presidential
obligation to enforce individual judgments in cases functions in
exactly the same fashion as does the Takings Clause of the
Constitution or the Bill of Attainder Clause or the Due Process
Clauses.47 These Clauses all protect individuals from being
singled out arbitrarily to bear some heavy burden for the pub-
lic good.48 In a democracy, presidents and politicians will be
checked by public opinion when their conduct affects the whole
public but they may be able to get away with misconduct that
affects only a single individual or a small class of people.49 It is
45. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
46. Some of these issues are discussed in Steven G. Calabresi, The Presi-
dent, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution: A Brief Positive Account of the
Role of Government Lawyers in the Development of Constitutional Law, 61
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (1998).
47. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9-11, 24-32, 39-41 (1993); Lawson & Moore, supra note 17,
at 1326-27.
48. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 17, at 1326-27.
49. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 78 (1980); Steven G.
Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L.
REV. 23, 75-78, 96-98 (1995). Consider William Howard Taft's description of
"the travails" of one Edward Livingston, who objected to President Thomas
Jefferson's "unauthorized presidential interference with his property-
When a public functionary abuses his power by an act which
bears on the community, his conduct excites attention, provokes
popular resentment, and seldom fails to receive the punishment it
merits. Should an individual be chosen for the victim, little sympa-
thy is created for his sufferings, if the interest of all is supposed to be
promoted by the ruin of one. The gloss of zeal for the public is there-
1999] 1431
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for this very reason that the Constitution entrusts the power to
make laws-the power to disturb or alter the baseline distribu-
tion of private rights-to Congress. And it is also for this very
reason that the Steel Seizure Case 5° has long been thought to
be so important. If elected presidents could take private prop-
erty or deprive an individual of liberty simply on their own say
so, then ours would be at best a system of democratic Caesars.
The Executive Branch of our government would not be, as Pro-
fessor Paulsen calls it, the Most Dangerous Branch-it would
be a tyranny.51
Court judgments are very much like the private property
that the Takings Clause of our Constitution protects from sei-
zure by executive officials absent full and just compensation
from the public fisc. 52 Often court judgments concern awards of
property and even when they concern liberty issues there is
frequently a monetary value that might be placed by the victo-
rious litigant on the rights at stake. No one would think it de-
sirable to let the President take an individual's property in
violation of the Takings Clause or to let the President arbi-
trarily imprison people in violation of the Due Process Clause,
and yet exactly the same values would be at stake if we were to
let the President unilaterally decide which court judgments he
wanted to execute or not. Again, a president with that power
would be an elected tyrant just as federal courts without the
power to execute their judgments would be ciphers.
Lastly, and most ironically, a president with the power to
defy court judgments would be dangerous in precisely the same
way that the imperial judiciary of recent years has been dan-
fore always spread over acts of oppression, and as a brilliant exertion
of energy in their favor, which, when viewed in its true light, would
be found a fatal blow to their rights.
In no government is this effect so easily produced as in a free re-
public; party spirit, inseparable from its existence, there aids the illu-
sion, and a popular leader is allowed in many instances impunity,
and sometimes rewarded with applause for acts that would make a
tyrant tremble on his throne.
Monaghan, supra note 47, at 26 n.123 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)). Professor Monaghan observes that Taft
thought Livingston's remarks "fully applicable to a proposal entertained by
Theodore Roosevelt to seize certain coal mines, even though no statute con-
ferred such authority to invade private rights." Id.
50. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
51. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (describing
the abuses of power that King George III committed).
52. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
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gerous. The problem with the imperial judiciary is that by five
to four votes it can too easily reach and bind the states with its
silly national policy ideas that are passed off as being interpre-
tations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Imperial Supreme
Court is our version of the French Revolution's Committee of
Public Safety-a five-person indirectly elected directorate that
binds a continent and 270 million people to follow its will.
Professor Paulsen's proposal would in my view replace
that five-person Committee with one elected President-a Na-
poleon or a Caesar. Much as I dislike the federal courts-and I
dislike them a lot 3-I am mortally certain I would like elective
Caesarism even less. Policy considerations thus confirm for me
what two hundred years of practice and the historical text of
the Constitution have already cemented into law. The Fram-
ers were right to legally bind the President to execute court
judgments absent a clear mistake54 just as they were right to in
other respects give all three branches of the federal govern-
ment the co-equal power to enforce and interpret the Constitu-
tion. The President is obligated to execute all court judgments
53. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Relimiting Federal Judicial Power:
Should Congress Play a Role?, 13 J.L. & PoL. 627, 629-38 (1997) (blasting fed-
eral judicial activism and laying out a detailed strategy for combating it).
54. In other words, I agree with Lawson & Moore, supra note 17, at 1314,
1329, that presidents may only review federal court judgments for constitu-
tionality if they give those judgments Thayerian deference. See, e.g., James
Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893) (arguing that judicial review is appro-
priate only where the political branches have made a clear mistake). Absent a
clear mistake, and the only such clear mistake I am aware of is Chief Justice
Taney's in Ex Parte Merryman, presidents are absolutely constitutionally
bound to execute even those court judgments with which they disagree. The
penalty for failing to fulfill this constitutional duty is impeachment and re-
moval and possibly prosecution for obstruction ofjustice.
That being said, there are judicial precedents like Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), that are
so blatantly unconstitutional and that are so evil in their consequences that I
believe presidents are constitutionally and morally obligated not to acquiesce
in them as "political rules." Thus, I think Presidents Lincoln and Reagan
were right to resist Dred Scott and Roe at every turn and to use their ap-
pointment power, their litigation power, and their power to recommend legis-
lation to seek the overthrow of these unconstitutional usurpations at every
turn. Dred Scott, of course, was overturned, but Roe still remains, as does the
obligation of this and all future Presidents to work day and night for its rever-
sal. As far as I am concerned, Roe is on a par with Dred Scott both in its un-
constitutionality and in the evil it has caused and is causing. Nevertheless,
until it is reversed court judgments rendered in reliance upon it must be
obeyed.
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absent a clear mistake, even those that concern the scope of his
constitutionally rooted executive privilege.
